

Mail promptly to NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston, Mass. 02110

2M1

(OVER)

FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE SPREAD AND EXTENT OF DAMAGE

1. Structural deficiencies influencing fire spread. Understructures unprotected open wood construction
Open stair or elevator shafts; non-fire-stopped walls, etc.; undivided attic; lack of fire walls; combustible fibreboard interior finish; combustible insulation; windowless walls; etc.
2. Fire protection deficiencies influencing fire spread. No private fire brigade no hydrants in immediate area, no patrol or watch service.
Fire door blocked open; inadequate water supplies for fire fighting (estimate flow available); poor hydrant spacing (give spacing); distance from nearest fire department; no private fire brigade; no fire extinguishers; lack of protection for special hazards, etc.
3. Contents features influencing fire spread. Oil slick on river stagnant under two trestles together with debris accumulated in oil slick.
Poor stock subdivision; high piled stock; windows blocked; flammable liquids improperly stored or handled; poor housekeeping; dust accumulation; oil on floor, walls, etc.
4. Record losses and performance of safes and vaults. None
5. Salvage operations during and after fire. None

REMARKS

Use this space to report other details that would contribute to an understanding of the factors responsible for this fire — weather conditions poor water supplies, inadequate manpower and equipment, etc. Include a sketch and additional sheets where appropriate.

Fire was discovered by train crew, who attempted to extinguish same with Dry Chemical extinguisher, range was ineffective and after emptying extinguisher, one man then ran across bridge to a yard telephone a distance of at least 1,000 feet to call Fire Department.

The yard hydrants in this area were shut off for construction of new building, then were disconnected, there are no hydrants in this area. It was necessary to have one Engine Company draft water from the river to supply hand lines, while the Fire Boat used 3 Deck Nozzles.

One Engine Company was dispatched to the West side of the river as a precautionary measure to prevent the spread of fire, in the event the trestles had collapsed.

Damage to the Norfolk and Western Trestle was severe and traffic had to be detoured. Damage to Newburgh & South Shore Trestle was not too severe and this trestle remained in service, handling traffic for both railroads.

Both these trestles were at the head of navigation and were stationary structures making it impossible to get the Fire Boat under either structure, fire in the understructure was finally extinguished with the use of a distributor nozzle.

This was a cloudy day with wind of 8 m/p/h from the ENE, temperature of 71° and humidity 48%

Each trestle contained one track and were approximately 350' long and 10' wide of wood construction supported on steel beams, spanning the Cuyahoga River.

Bernard J. Campbell
Reporting Officer or Inspector

Rank